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ABSTRACT
Crispin Wright maintains that the architecture of perceptual justification is such that we
can acquire justification for our perceptual beliefs only if we have antecedent 
justification for ruling out any sceptical alternative. Wright contends that this principle 
doesn’t elicit scepticism, for we are non-evidentially entitled to accept the negation of 
any sceptical alternative. Sebastiano Moruzzi has challenged Wright’s contention by 
arguing that since our non-evidential entitlements don’t remove the epistemic risk of 
our perceptual beliefs, they don’t actually enable us to acquire justification for these 
beliefs. In this paper I show that Wright’s responses to Moruzzi are ineffective and that 
Moruzzi’s argument is validated by probabilistic reasoning. I also suggest that Wright 
couldn’t answer Moruzzi’s challenge without weakening the support available for his 
conception of the architecture of perceptual justification.
Keywords: epistemic entitlement; epistemic risk; perceptual justification; 
scepticism; Crispin Wright; Roger White, Duncan Pritchard.   
1. Introduction
Some of Crispin Wright’s ideas have been playing a pivotal role in recent epistemological 
conversation. Wright maintains that the architecture of perceptual justification is such that we can 
acquire justification for our perceptual beliefs only if we have antecedent justification for ruling out 
any sceptical alternative. He contends that this fact doesn’t elicit scepticism, for we are non-
evidentially entitled to accept the negation of any sceptical alternative. Sebastiano Moruzzi has 
challenged Wright’s contention by arguing that since our non-evidential entitlements don’t remove 
the epistemic risk of our perceptual beliefs, they don’t actually enable us to acquire justification for 
these beliefs. In this paper I show that Wright’s responses to Moruzzi are ineffective and that 
Moruzzi’s argument is validated by probabilistic reasoning. I also suggest that Wright couldn’t 
answer Moruzzi’s challenge without weakening the support available for his conception of the 
architecture of perceptual justification.
2This is the paper’s structure: in §2 I detail Wright’s conception of the architecture of 
perceptual justification and Wright’s entitlement theory. In §3 I review Moruzzi’s objection. In §4 I 
criticize Wright’s responses to Moruzzi. In §5 I argue that Moruzzi’s objection is validated by 
Bayesian reasoning. In §6 I draw my conclusions.     
2. Wright’s epistemology of perception
Wright (2004, 2007 and 2014) contends that the architecture of perceptual justification1 is such 
that:2 
(PJ) A subject S’s experience as if p gives S (defeasible) justification for believing p 
only if S has antecedent justification for accepting ~sh, where ~sh is the logical
negation of any sceptical alternative3 sh to p.4
(PJ) raises at least two concerns. To begin with, it looks at odds with everyday epistemic practices; 
one may thus doubt that (PJ) is true. Ordinarily, the reasons we attribute to ourselves or others for 
holding perceptual beliefs make no reference to sceptical alternatives. Imagine you have an 
experience as if the cat is on the mat. You would normally answer the question ‘What reason do 
you have to believe that the cat is on the mat?’ by saying ‘I see it’. Responding ‘I see it and have 
independent reason to rule out that I’m deceived by the Matrix’ would appear out-of-place (cf. 
Pryor 2000 and McGrath 2013).
The second concern is that (PJ) prompts perceptual scepticism (cf. Pryor 2000 and Schiffer 
2004). Consider a subject S experiencing as if (P) the cat is on the mat. Suppose SH is the 
1 By ‘justification’ I will always mean propositional (rather than doxastic) justification.
2 Epistemic conservatives like White (2006) and Neta (2010) defend similar principles.
3 By ‘sceptical alternative’ I refer to global sceptical hypotheses like the Cartesian demon scenario or the Matrix 
scenario.
4 (PJ) is normally attributed to Wright (see for instance White 2006, Silins 2007, Neta 2010 and Silva 2010). Wright 
seems sometimes to endorse an alternative principle, according to which S’s experience as if p gives S justification for 
claiming that S has justification for believing p only if S has antecedent justification for accepting ~sh. In this paper I 
criticize Wright interpreted as a supporter of (PJ). For discussion about these two alternative readings of Wright’s 
conception of the structure perceptual justification see McGlynn (2017). 
3proposition that P is false but the Matrix makes S hallucinate as if P.5 The sceptic may adduce (PJ) 
to argue that S’s experience as if P gives S justification for believing P only if S has antecedent 
justification for accepting ~SH. The sceptic will insist that S cannot have this antecedent 
justification. For any a posteriori evidence S might happen to possess can be conjectured to be in 
turn a hallucinatory state caused by the Matrix. Furthermore, S doesn’t have a priori evidence for 
~SH. So S has no evidence justifying her acceptance of ~SH. The sceptic will conclude that S’s 
experience as if P cannot justify S’s belief that P and––by generalizing this example––that S’s 
experiences cannot justify any of S’s perceptual beliefs.
To address the first concern, Wright has argued that the epistemological views that disallow 
(PJ), like Pryor (2000 and 2004)’s dogmatism, are in various ways problematic6 (cf. Wright 2007). 
The only direct argument––and I think the most forceful case––for the truth of (PJ) is nonetheless a 
Bayesian one due to White (2006), who defends a view of the architecture of perceptual 
justification similar to Wright’s. Let me outline White’s argument, as I will use it later on. White 
adopts an entrenched model that construes epistemic justification as rational confidence. Let Pr be a
probability function interpreted subjectively. Pr(p) expresses S’s rational confidence that p. Pr(p|q) 
expresses S’s rational confidence that p conditional on S’s learning q. Suppose E is the proposition 
that S has an experience as if (P) the cat is on the mat, and SH is the proposition that P is false but 
the Matrix makes S hallucinate as if P. Since SH entails E, if S learns SH, S must be certain that E. 
Hence Pr(E|SH) = 1. Since S shouldn’t expect to experience as if the cat on the mat, Pr(E) < 1. Thus
Pr(E|SH) > Pr(E). This inequality implies that Pr(~SH|E) < Pr(~SH). Furthermore, since P entails 
~SH, Pr(P|E) ≤ Pr(~SH|E). The last two inequalities imply by transitivity that Pr(P|E) < Pr(~SH). 
This formula says that if S learns E, S’s confidence in P must remain strictly smaller than S’s prior 
confidence in ~SH. Thus, S’s learning E can make S rationally confident of P’s truth only if S is 
antecedently rationally confident of ~SH’s truth. This shows that S’s experiencing as if P can give 
5 I use small letters for propositional variable and capital letters for propositional constants.
6 For instance, they would produce easy justification and infringe probability principles.
4S justification for believing P only if S has antecedent justification for accepting ~SH (cf. 2006: 
534-534). This argument can be reformulated to apply to any perceptual proposition p, any 
proposition e stating that S experiences as if p, and any correlated sceptical alternative sh. The 
conclusion is that
(PC) Pr(p|e) < Pr(~sh). 
(PC) vindicates (PJ).
Although Wright often construes epistemic justification as rational confidence (see for 
instance 2014: 233-234), he hasn’t explicitly adduced (PC) to support (PJ). Wright (2007: 42) has 
nevertheless levelled a Bayesian objection to Pryor’s dogmatism consisting of a variant or 
incomplete version of White’s argument.7 So Wright would endorse this argument. Note that (PJ) 
takes S’s evidence to be S’s experience as if p, whereas (PC) takes S’s evidence to be S’s reflective 
belief that (e) she has an experience as if p. One could question whether S’s belief that e constitutes 
a reliable model of S’s experience as if p in epistemic evaluations (cf. Moretti 2015). Wright 
nevertheless doesn’t distinguish between one’s experience and one’s reflective belief that one has 
an experience when discussing scepticism (cf. 2002, 2004, 2007 and 2014). Wright seems to share 
White (2006: 353) and Silins (2007: 120n17)’s conviction that one’s experiences and one’s 
reflective beliefs about one’s experiences are interchangeable in most epistemic contexts.
To address the second concern––the worry that (PJ) elicits scepticism––Wright (2004, 2007 
and 2014) admits that there is no or very little evidence in support of propositions like ~SH. Yet he 
argues that there exists a type of non-evidential justification––called by him entitlement––that all 
rational subjects possess by default for accepting the logical negation of any sceptical alternative.8 
Acceptance is an attitude more inclusive than belief. Belief entails acceptance but the reverse is 
7 The objection––which Wright attributes to Schiffer (2004)––says that the dogmatist is committed to maintaining that, 
for any p and e, Pr(p|e) must be sufficiently high, but that she cannot provide a justification for the required value of 
Pr(~sh) and other priors.
8 More generally, for Wright, we are entitled to accept certain hinge propositions inclusive of these negations.
5false. Wright acknowledges that an entitlement to accept ~SH is not one to believe ~SH. For it is 
dubious that S could rationally believe a proposition with no or very little evidence for its truth (cf. 
2004: 176). This thesis is widely held in epistemology nowadays (cf. Chignell 2017: §5). Wright 
suggests that the type of acceptance licensed by S’s entitlements is rational trust, or a very similar 
attitude (cf. 2004: 194).
Wright’s thesis that we are entitled to accept propositions like ~SH has attracted criticism of
various types (see McGlynn 2017 for a survey). For instance, some authors contend that what 
Wright calls entitlement isn’t epistemic justification (cf. Pritchard 2005 and Jenkins 2007). Wright 
(2014) has made a good effort to address most of these objections. In the following, I concentrate 
on an important criticism made in discussion by Sebastiano Moruzzi (cf. Wright 2004: 208n 26), 
which I think hasn’t properly been addressed so far.
3. Moruzzi’s objection
Moruzzi’s challenge exploits a notion of epistemic risk introduced by Wright himself. Wright 
emphasizes that whenever S accepts a proposition p the truth of which is insufficiently supported by
her evidence, S runs a risk––the one of accepting a proposition as true that is actually false. Since 
this type of risk is incompatible with S’s justifiedly believing and knowing p, Wright calls it 
epistemic risk. More accurately, the relation that Wright claims to hold between epistemic risk and 
epistemic justification is this: S’s accepting p is epistemically risky if and only if S’s evidence 
doesn’t suffice to justify her believing p. Note that S’s accepting p when p is insufficiently 
supported by evidence would be epistemically risky even if S’s acceptance were justified by an 
entitlement to p. This is so because this entitlement of S would not rest on or produce any evidence 
for p’s truth. For example, Wright (2004: 208-209) acknowledges that S’s accepting ~SH would be
epistemically risky despite S’s entitlement to ~SH.
6Moruzzi’s objection rests on the intuition that for any p and correlated sceptical alternative 
sh, the epistemic risk of ~sh transmits to p. The objection says that since S’s accepting ~sh is 
epistemically risky despite S’s entitlement to ~sh, S’s accepting p is also epistemically risky 
despite S’s experiencing as if p. Consequently, S’s justification for p depending on S’s experience 
as if p (if any) cannot sustain S’s belief that p. If this is true, S’s entitlements might permit S to trust
perceptual propositions, but they cannot enable S to believe them. The sceptical challenge invited 
by (PJ) would remain unanswered in this case.  
4. Analysis of Wright’s responses 
Wright (2004) and Wright (2014) have respectively given Moruzzi’s objection two different 
responses. In both papers Wright insists that no epistemic risk transmits from ~sh to p but the 
reasons he adduces go in opposite directions. I now criticize both responses in turn.
Wright (2004: 207-209) argues that the intuition that the epistemic risk of ~sh transmits to 
p is flawed because it relies on a false assumption.
Since the risk involved is that of acceptance of a proposition without knowledge of or 
evidential [justification] for its truth, the idea that the risk transfers from [~sh] to p is 
just the contrapositive of the idea that knowledge and evidential [justification] transmit
from p to [~sh]. So interpreted, then, the worry about [epistemic risk] is just a version 
of the discredited assumption that [justification] is unrestrictedly transmissive. (2014: 
229)   
Let’s unpack this condensed explanation. The expression ‘evidential justification’ refers to 
justification depending on evidence (i.e. a belief or an experience) sufficient to sustain belief. Recall
that p entails ~sh. Wright (2002, 2003 and 2007) has argued that evidential justification doesn’t 
always transmit across entailment. S’s justification for p resting on evidence e transmits across the 
entailment from p to q––according to Wright––just in case (i) S has justification for believing p 
from e, (ii) S knows that p entails q, and (iii) S has justification for believing q in virtue of the truth 
7of both (i) and (ii). Wright claims that (iii) remains unsatisfied whenever S’s acquiring justification 
for believing p from e requires S to have antecedent justification for accepting q. Suppose for 
instance S has two identical copies, H and H*, of Hamlet. O is the disjunctive proposition that this 
book looks like H or H*. A is the proposition the book is actually H. B is the proposition that the 
book is not H*. S’s acquiring justification for believing A from O requires S to have antecedent 
justification for accepting B. Suppose that this requirement is met and that (i) S learns O thereby 
acquiring justification for believing A. Also suppose that (ii) S knows that A entails B. In these 
circumstances––according to Wright (2002, 2003 and 2007)––it is intuitive that S cannot acquire 
justification for believing B in virtue of the truth of (i) and (ii). So (iii) is false. This is a case of 
transmission failure. If (PJ) is true, the entailment from p to ~sh should also instantiate 
transmission failure, for S’s acquiring justification for believing p from her experience as if p 
requires S to possess antecedent justification for accepting ~sh (cf. Wright 2007).
My best interpretation of Wright’s passage quoted above is this: if you have the impression 
that the epistemic risk of ~sh transmits to p, this is only because you mistakenly presuppose that 
evidential justification is unrestrictedly transmissive so that any evidential justification for p must 
transmit to ~sh. In fact, if you presuppose this and realize that S doesn’t have evidential 
justification for ~sh because ~sh is epistemically risky, you are bound to conclude––on pain of 
contradiction––that S doesn’t have justification for believing p either, which means that p is also 
epistemically risky.
This diagnosis is misguided because it confuses S’s justification for ~sh that S acquires 
upon experiencing as if p with S’s antecedent justification for ~sh resting on S’s mere entitlement 
to ~sh. Suppose you endorse both (PJ) and Wright’s entitlement theory but presuppose that 
evidential justification is unrestrictedly transmissive. Imagine you realize that S lacks antecedent 
justification for believing ~sh. Given your presupposition, you can still conclude without 
8contradiction that S has justification for believing ~sh––namely, evidential justification transmitted
to ~sh from p. In fact note that this justification transmitted to ~sh is not antecedent justification 
for believing ~sh, which S lacks, but justification that S is supposed to acquire when she 
experiences as if p and deduces ~sh from p. Since you can conclude that S has evidential 
justification for ~sh, you aren’t bound to maintain that S lacks evidential justification for p, so that 
p is epistemically risky. This shows that the intuition that ~sh’s epistemic risk transmits to p 
doesn’t depend on presupposing (mistakenly or not) that evidential justification is unrestrictedly 
transmissive.
Wright (2014: 228-235) has given Moruzzi’s objection a novel response. It says that no 
epistemic risk transmits from ~sh to p because ~sh is not epistemically risky after all. This 
response too appears flawed to me.9
Although Wright (2014) endorses (PJ), in this paper he concedes that evidential 
justification––when suitably qualified––transmits from p to ~sh. Wright contends that (PJ) blocks 
the transmission of two types of justification. Firstly, no justification transmitted from p to ~sh can 
be a first-time justification for accepting ~sh. For S can acquire justification for p from 
experiencing as if p only if S has already justification for accepting ~sh. Furthermore, no 
justification transmitted to ~sh from p can raise ~sh’s ‘rational credibility’. For ‘whatever limit 
there was to the rational credibility of [~sh] as an object of trust..., it remains as an upper bound on 
its rational credibility as an object of belief based on the appearance that [p]’ (2014: 233).10 Wright 
argues that, nevertheless, (PJ) doesn’t debar evidential justification from transmitting from p to ~sh
if the justification is neither a first time justification for accepting ~sh nor one that boosts ~sh’s 
credibility. Drawing from Hawthorne (2004: 39-40) and McGlynn (2014), Wright contends that this
transmission can persuasively take place through a two-stage inference: suppose S has evidential 
9 I put forward this diagnosis more hesitantly, as I found Wright’s discussion less clear in this case.
10 This claim is vindicated by White’s model, as Pr(~sh|e) < Pr(~sh).
9justification for p. This justification will first transmit to the disjunction p v ~sh, entailed by p. This
is so, for Wright, because it is compelling that any justification for believing either disjunct of a 
disjunction is by itself justification for believing the disjunction. S’s justification for p v ~sh will 
then transfer to ~sh, which is a priori equivalent to the disjunction (cf. 2014: 231-233). Wright 
thinks that since S is entitled to ~sh, S will acquire justification for believing p from her experience
as if p, and this evidential justification will transfer to ~sh. This would show that Moruzzi’s 
challenge ultimately dissolves, as ‘we no longer have the assumption in place that there can be no 
evidential [justification] for [~sh]’ (2014: 235).11 In other words, we no longer have the assumption
in place that ~sh is epistemically risky. 
This response to Moruzzi puts the cart before the horse. Wright contends that evidential 
justification can transmit from p to ~sh. Suppose his explanation is correct. Evidential justification 
will transmit from p to ~sh only if S does have evidential justification for p in the first instance. But
Moruzzi’s objection was precisely that S couldn’t have this justification. Given that S’s entitlement 
to ~sh cannot remove ~sh’s epistemic risk, and this risk––according to Moruzzi––transmits to p, p 
must be epistemically risky when S experiences as if p. So S’s justification for p based on S’s 
experience as if p (if any) will be unable to sustain S’s belief that p. Hence, there will be no 
evidential justification to be transmitted from p to ~sh in the first instance.
5. Transmission of epistemic risk
Although Wright’s responses to Moruzzi are ineffective, we cannot conclude yet that Moruzzi’s 
objection goes through. For Moruzzi’s claim that ~sh’s epistemic risk transmits to p hasn’t been 
substantiated. In this section I will show that this claim can be validated through (PC) once the 
11 Wright maintains that (what he calls) the leaching problem dissolves, but Moruzzi’s challenge is the only version of 
the leaching problem analysed in his paper (cf. 2014: 228-229).
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standard probabilistic account of risk is presupposed. Since this standard account has recently been 
challenged, I would like to dwell on this issue before proceeding any further.
The term ‘risk’ is customarily taken to refer to the probability of an unwanted event, where 
this probability is estimated on a relevant body of evidence. This usage is for instance exemplified 
by the statement that, on the current medical evidence, the risk that a smoker’s life is shortened by 
some smoking-related disease is about ½ (cf. Hansson 2018).12 It might look self-evident that our 
judgements about risk track probability. Pritchard (2015 and 2016) has nevertheless challenged this 
thesis with an apparent counterexample.
(BOMB)
Case 1: An evil scientist has rigged up a large bomb, which he has hidden in a populated 
area. If the bomb explodes, many people will die. There is no way of discovering the bomb 
before the time it is set to detonate. The bomb will only detonate, however, if a certain set of
numbers comes up on the next national lottery draw. The odds of these numbers appearing 
is fourteen million to one. It is not possible to interfere with this lottery draw.
Case 2: An evil scientist has rigged up a large bomb, which he has hidden in a populated 
area. If the bomb explodes, many people will die. There is no way of discovering the bomb 
before the time it is set to detonate. The bomb will only detonate, however, if a series of 
three highly unlikely events obtains. First, the weakest horse in the field at the Grand 
National, Lucky Loser, must win the race by at least ten furlongs. Second, the worst team 
remaining in the FA Cup draw, Accrington Stanley, must beat the best team remaining, 
Manchester United, by at least ten goals. And third, the queen of England must 
spontaneously choose to speak a complete sentence of Polish during her next public speech. 
The odds of this chain of events occurring are fourteen million to one. It is not possible to 
interfere with the outcomes of any of the events in this chain. (Pritchard 2015: 441)
Pritchard observes that although the unwanted event––the bomb’s detonating––is equally likely in 
both cases, its risk in Case 1 is intuitively higher than in Case 2. For we have the feeling that, 
despite the detonation triggering events have equal chances in both cases, the detonation triggering 
event in Case 1 could happen more easily than the detonation triggering event in Case 2. All that is 
12 A refinement of this conception, adopted in professional risk management and economics, interprets ‘risk’ as 
referring to the expectation value of a possible negative event, which is the product of the event’s probability and some 
measure of its severity (cf. Hansson 2018). To avoid sterile complications, I follow Pritchard (2015 and 2016) and 
Bricker (2018) in setting aside this more technical notion. 
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needed for the detonation triggering event in Case 1 to materialize is simply that a few numbered 
balls be extracted in a particular sequence. In contrast, the detonation triggering event in Case 2 
could take place only if many weird things took place all together.
To explain our intuitions about risk elicited by cases like (BOMB), Pritchard develops a 
modal conception of risk alternative to the probabilistic one. Pritchard explicates the notion of easy 
possibility by exploiting the familiar idea that possible worlds are more or less close to the actual 
world in the sense that they are more or less similar to it. He submits that an event could easily 
happen just in case the closest worlds in which it takes place are very similar to the actual world, 
and that an event could happen more easily than another just in case the closest worlds in which it 
takes place are more similar to the actual one than the closest worlds in which the other event 
occurs. The detonation triggering event in Case 1 could happen more easily than the detonation 
triggering event in Case 2 because the closest worlds in which it takes place are more similar to the 
actual one than the closest worlds in which the other event occurs.
In this account, the degree of risk of an unwanted event is proportional to its modal distance 
from to the actual world, rather than its likelihood. Precisely, the degree of risk of a proposition p 
describing a given event is determined by the degree of closeness to the actual world of the closest 
worlds in which p is true: the closer these worlds, the higher the risk. Suppose now that P states that
the bomb is detonating. Since P is true in very close worlds in Case 1, but only in remote worlds in 
Case 2, P proves more risky in Case 1 than in Case 2. 
Bricker (2018) observes that Pritchard’s modal account, if working at all, would also explain
cases in which our judgements seem to track probability, since probability and modal ordering are 
often correlated. (For example, note that your serious bodily injuring yourself from playing chess is 
both a very improbable event and one that happens only in very remote worlds.) The modal account
of risk would thus be capable of handling cases that the probabilistic account cannot handle but also
cases that appear to suggest that risk tracks probability.
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It is far from clear, however, that Pritchard’s account constitutes “the correct analysis of 
risk” or that it should be preferred to the probabilistic account. Pritchard’s reasons to reject the 
probabilistic account primarily hinge on our intuitive judgments about risk elicited by (BOMB). 
Pritchard thinks that the best explanation of why we make these judgments is that we apply his 
modal notion of risk, which we would implicitly possess. But this argument can be questioned. The 
judgments elicited by (BOMB) might simply stem from our heuristics, cognitive biases, or similar 
psychological factors. So these judgments might be no evidence that our pre-theoretical conception 
of risk is akin to that outlined by Pritchard. For instance, note that the degree of probability of the 
detonation triggering event in Case 2 has been stipulated––no explanation of how it has been 
worked out is offered. Since the numerical value supplied by Pritchard looks terribly far-fetched, it 
is perhaps natural that we (or our sub-personal cognitive systems) tend to ignore that piece of 
information. If this is true, psychology can offer various explanations of why we end up judging 
that the unwanted event is less risky in Case 2 than in Case 1. Some explanations are compatible 
with the probabilistic account of risk. For instance, Kahneman and Tversky (1974) have shown that 
there is a positive correlation between how easily a subject simulates (i.e. mentally pictures) an 
event and how probable she estimates that the event is. Note that the detonation triggering event of 
Case 2 is far less easy to simulate than the detonation triggering event of Case 1.
The modal account of risk has counterintuitive consequences that the probabilistic account 
doesn’t imply. Suppose you are about to flip a coin C that you know to be fair, and you have bet 
£100 on heads, while your opponent has bet £100 on tails. If you win, you get £100, otherwise you 
lose £100.13 It is intuitive that before seeing the outcome, you should judge the proposition that
(P) C lands tails, 
to be considerably risky. The probabilistic account explains why: given your evidence, the chance 
that the unwanted event that P takes place is ½. The modal account provides an alternative 
explanation: your evidence allows you to conclude that the possible worlds in which P is true are 
13 If don’t value money, replace it with anything else you value.
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very close. Imagine now that C lands heads, and that you see it. In light of your new evidence, you 
should no longer judge P to be is risky to any extent. This is straightforwardly explained by the 
probabilistic account: the new evidence indicates that P’s chance has dropped to zero. However, on 
the modal account you are still rationally required to take P to be risky to some degree. For your 
new evidence still allows you to conclude that the worlds in which P is true are very close. (In those
worlds you don’t see that C lands heads –– you see it lands tails. But this doesn’t make them remote
worlds.) More generally, on the modal account, any event that could have easily happened but is 
known not to have happen must be taken to be risky to some extent. This doesn’t match the intuitive
idea of risk. As Hansson (2005: 68) has emphasized, ‘Risks are always connected to lack of 
knowledge... if we know that no explosion will take place, then there is no reason... to talk about 
risk’. 
Producing a thorough assessment of the modal account of risk would take us too far afield. 
Let me only add that Pritchard (2015 and 2016) has attempted to defend his account by showing 
that it can illuminate (BOMB) but also by describing independent supporting evidence available in 
psychology and cognitive sciences. Bricker (2018) has nonetheless adduced alternative empirical 
evidence that looks incompatible with Pritchard’s modal account. Importantly, Bricker has also 
detailed an imaginary case similar to (BOMB) that prompts judgments about risk that appear 
unexplainable by both the modal account and the probabilistic account. Thus, this interesting 
dispute is far from being settled.
My view is that to investigate whether epistemic risk transmits, we don’t need to produce 
“the correct analysis of risk”. There might be no such analysis––perhaps our pre-theoretical 
conception of risk is partly incoherent or indeterminate and admits of more than just one analysis or
precisification. To investigate whether or not epistemic risk transmits, we only need to rely on a 
notion of risk sufficiently close to the one that Wright and Moruzzi presuppose in their dispute. 
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There is no reason to think that Wright and Moruzzi adopt a conception of risk different from the 
orthodox one, which is probabilistic.
It is also noteworthy that if Wright endorsed Pritchard’s modal conception of risk, he would 
face a kind of conceptual incoherence. For he would have to acknowledge that there are many 
propositions the acceptance of which is epistemically risky but, simultaneously, not risky. To see 
this, remember that Wright holds that thanks to our entitlements to rule out all sceptical alternatives,
our perceptual beliefs are normally justified. Wright is thus committed to taking the actual world to 
be broadly as it appears to be, and so to taking any sceptical conjecture sh to be true only in remote 
possible worlds. Consider now any conjecture sh of this type. If Wright adopted the modal 
conception of risk, he would need to acknowledge that although our best evidence cannot justify 
believing ~sh, so that accepting ~sh is epistemically risky, accepting ~sh is not risky. For ~sh is 
false only in remote possible worlds.14
 Let me now show that once the probabilistic account of risk is presupposed, Moruzzi’s 
claim that epistemic risk transmits can be validated through (PC). Take any perceptual proposition 
p, a proposition e stating that S experiences as if p, and any correlated sceptical alternative sh. The 
degree of risk that ~sh is false––expressed by RSF(~sh)––can be identified with Pr(sh), where Pr is
a probability function interpreted subjectively.15 The degree of risk that p is false given e––
expressed by RSF(p|e)––can be identified with Pr(~p|e). Since RSF(~sh) = Pr(sh) and RSF(p|e) = 
Pr(~p|e), it is easy to show that (PC) Pr(p|e) < Pr(~sh) is equivalent to:
(RS) RSF(p|e) > RSF(~sh).
14 I don’t want to suggest that Pritchard’s modal account of risk is epistemologically flawed or problematic because of 
this result. My view is that the modal account may harmonize with externalist epistemologies (like the one described in 
Pritchard 2016) but it appears incoherent with the internalist approach to justification and knowledge generally 
favoured by Wright.
15 Risk is usually interpreted as referring to the objective probability or chance of an event. Nevertheless, objective 
probability can in principle be translated into subjective probability because, for every proposition q, any rational 
subject S must conform her degree of confidence in q to the chance of q once S knows this chance, in accordance with 
Lewis’ Principal Principle.
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(RS) states that the degree of risk that p is false given e is strictly higher than the degree of risk that
~sh is false independent of e. (RS) validates Moruzzi’s claim that ~sh’s epistemic risk transmits to
p. To see this, take r to be a threshold value of epistemic risk. In other words, suppose that 
whenever r is exceeded by a proposition, the risk that it is false is so high that S’s believing that 
proposition would be unjustified. (RS) entails that if RsF(~sh) > r, then RsF(p|e) > r. That is to say, 
if S’s accepting ~sh on the basis of a non-evidential entitlement (and so prior to learning e) is 
epistemically risky, S’s accepting p upon learning e is also epistemically risky.
6. Concluding remarks
Since it is plausible that the epistemic risk of ~sh transmits to p, Wright’s entitlement theory 
appears unable to neutralize the sceptical challenge arising from (PJ). Wright still has some space 
for manoeuvre though. He could try to argue that White’s Bayesian model is unreliable or 
misleading. For instance, he might contend that probability calculus is ill-suited to model our 
rational confidence when we reflect on outlandish conjectures like those adduced by the sceptic (cf. 
Weatherson 2007).16 As already suggested, Wright could also challenge the assumption at the hart 
of White’s model that one’s experience and one’s reflective belief that one has an experience are 
relevantly similar in terms of justifying power (cf. Moretti 2015). If responses like these were to 
succeed, however, Wright should drop the apparently convincing case for (PJ) made by White. One 
way or another, Wright’s epistemology of perception would be endangered.17
16 Weatherson (2007) argues that sceptical conjectures (and their negations) are uncertain rather than risky––in 
accordance with Keynes (1937)’s distinction––and that standard probability calculus cannot model uncertainty.   
17 I’m very grateful to Peter Brössel, Davide Fassio, Federico Luzzi, Matthew McGrath, Kevin Olivier, Tommaso 
Piazza, Jim Pryor, Martin Smith, Ulrich Stegmann, Stephan Torre, Crispin Wright and a Reviewer and an Associate 
Editor of this Journal for helpful criticism and comments upon drafts of this paper.
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